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ABSTRACT
We present an algorithm for computing class-specific universal adversarial pertur-
bations for deep neural networks. Such perturbations can induce mis-classification
in a large fraction of images of a specific class. Unlike previous methods that
use iterative optimization for computing a universal perturbation, the proposed
method employs a perturbation that is a linear function of weights of the neural
network and hence can be computed much faster. The method does not require any
training data and has no hyper-parameters. The attack obtains 34% to 51% fool-
ing rate on state-of-the-art deep neural networks on ImageNet and transfers across
models. We also study the characteristics of the decision boundaries learned by
standard and adversarially trained models to understand the universal adversarial
perturbations.
1 INTRODUCTION
The vulnerability of state-of-the-art neural networks to adversarial perturbations was first studied
in (Szegedy et al., 2014). Adversarial perturbations are visually imperceptible modifications to the
input of neural networks that results in abrupt change in output. Subsequent works (Goodfellow
et al., 2015; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018) have in-
troduced stronger attacks that induce more mis-classifications with perturbations of smaller norm.
Adversarial examples suggest that while CNNs perform remarkably well, they may not be learning
interpretable and robust features (as discussed by (Tsipras et al., 2018)).
Another line of research focuses on adversarial attacks that pose a serious security threat in real-
world systems. Adversarial examples transfer across different models and this property enables
practical black-box attacks (Papernot et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2016; Engstrom et al., 2018). Machine
learning systems that operate in the physical world with inputs from different sensors have also been
shown to be vulnerable to such attacks (Kurakin et al., 2017). (Bhagoji et al., 2017; Ilyas et al.,
2018b;a) have also shown that adversaries with a limited number of query access to model and
information about the prediction of top labels can also construct adversarial examples.
Most of the proposed defenses against adversarial examples have been subsequently broken or had
its efficacy severely reduced (Uesato et al., 2018; Athalye et al., 2018). Currently, adversarial train-
ing with PGD (Madry et al., 2018) perturbation is the state-of-the-art defense against adversarial
examples . However, this defense is computationally expensive and isn’t robust to sets of perturba-
tions with different norm constraint that weren’t used during adversarial training. Recent work has
focused on certified defenses that computes a provable upper bound on the adversarial perturbation
against which the model is robust and try to maximize it (Kolter & Wong, 2017; Raghunathan et al.,
2018; Wong et al., 2018; Carlini et al., 2017).
We present a novel method for constructing class-wise universal adversarial perturbations that can
induce mis-classification for a large fraction of images of a particular class. The attack is particularly
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Figure 1: Examples of images after adding adversarial perturbation. Label of clean images (left to right): violin,
steel arch bridge, lotion, abacus. Predicted Label of adversarial images (left to right): flute, racket, carpenter’s
kit, mouth-harp
interesting due to its simplicity. It can be crafted using a linear function of the trained weights of
deep neural networks. The technique doesn’t require access to the training dataset and adversarial
perturbations for the deep learning model can be calculated within seconds. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our approach is the first work on computing (class-wise) universal adversarial perturbations
on deep neural networks without any iterative optimization.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We propose a data-independent method for generating class-wise universal adversarial per-
turbations. The proposed perturbation exploits the linearity of the decision boundaries
of deep neural networks. Since the proposed algorithm isn’t optimization-based and has
a closed form formula, it can generate universal perturbation much faster than previous
methods (Mopuri et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017a).
2. We evaluate the performance of the proposed method on models trained over MNIST (Le-
cun et al., 1989), CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) and ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015)
datasets. We also find that the attack has high cross-model generalizability.
3. We find that the directions of example-specific adversarial perturbations are aligned with
our universal perturbation. We conduct experiments to support the hypothesis that class
boundaries in neural networks are largely linear. We also find that some classes in ImageNet
dataset are inherently harder to misclassify using universal adversarial perturbations.
2 RELATED WORK
Recently, (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017a) demonstrated that state-of-the-art neural networks are
vulnerable to image-agnostic adversarial perturbations. They start with a perturbation v = 0 ,
and proceed iteratively over a subset of the training dataset. At each iteration, they compute the
smallest ∆v such that v + ∆v induces mis-classification in the current batch of images and modify
v = v+ ∆v. To ensure that ||v||p <  is satisfied, they project v on the `p(where p ∈ [1,∞]) ball of
radius with center 0 at each iteration. They generate adversarial perturbation through this algorithm
and found that it generalized to the validation dataset. Since the perturbations also generalize well
across deep neural networks, an adversary can generate universal perturbations for a model even in
a black-box setting.
In Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. (2017b), Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. derive the sufficient conditions on
decision boundaries for the existence of universal adversarial perturbations, and these conditions are
empirically verified for deep networks. The analysis shows that it is necessary to suppress the space
of shared positive adversarial directions for robustness against universal adversarial perturbations.
(Khrulkov & Oseledets, 2018) present a method for constructing universal adversarial perturbations
on ImageNet models using only 64 images. There has also been work on generating universal
adversarial perturbations through a generative model (Poursaeed et al., 2018; Hayes & Danezis,
2017; Reddy Mopuri et al., 2018). For a comprehensive review of the work done in the area of
adversarial examples, please refer (Yuan et al., 2019; Akhtar & Mian, 2018).
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The paper closest to our work is (Mopuri et al., 2017), where the authors propose a method of
generating universal perturbations that is independent of training data. They start with a random
perturbation and iteratively optimize to over-saturate the features at intermediate convolution layers
in the target model. Their optimization objective is:
L = −log(
K∏
i=1
li(∆~x)) such that ||∆~x||∞ <  (1)
where li(∆~x) is the average activation of ith layer on input ∆~x, K is the number of CNN layers
over which they do the optimization and  is the max-norm constraint.
However, our paper is different from (Mopuri et al., 2017) on the following counts:
1. In (Mopuri et al., 2017), the perturbation is not optimized for eq.1 till convergence. Instead,
they use a held-out set and terminate the optimization process when the fooling rate on this
set stops increasing. Our method doesn’t use any validation data for computing adversarial
perturbation.
2. Unlike (Mopuri et al., 2017), we don’t use iterative optimization because of which our
method is much faster. Additionally, the absence of hyper-parameters in our method pre-
cludes any fine-tuning of hyper-parameters.
3. A limitation of our work is that the adversary needs to know the ground truth class of clean
examples. The validity of this assumption depends on the application, but we would like to
point out that the adversary can use our perturbation for stopping the model from predicting
a particular class in any scenario. For example, the adversary can stop the network from
predicting class Ci by always adding the perturbation for class Ci regardless of the class of
clean image.
3 METHODOLOGY
In this section, we formalize the notion of class wise universal perturbations and propose a method
for crafting such perturbations. Let ψi denote a distribution of images of class i in Rd, and C be a
neural network classifier with k classes that outputs for each image ~x ∈ Rd an estimated class C(~x)
(where C(~x) ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}). We aim to construct perturbation vectors ∆~xi ∈ Rd for each class i
(where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}) that fools the classifier C on almost all data-points sampled from ψi. That
is we require ∆~xi such that
C(~x+ ∆~xi) 6= C(~x) for ~x ∼ ψi
and ||∆~xi||∞ ≤  (2)
Our construction of adversarial perturbations for deep neural networks is motivated from the optimal
adversarial attack in linear classifiers. Consider a linear/affine classifier F with k classes, such that:
F (~x) = arg max
i
fi(~x)
fi(~x) =
~wTi ~x+
~bi | i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}
(3)
For any input ~x with F (~x) = l, F outputs the same label inside a convex polyhedron S =
{~x|fl(~x) >= fi(~x), i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}}. The distance to the decision boundary separating class l
and class i is
disti(x) =
|fi(~x)− fl(~x)|
|| ~wi − ~wl||1 (4)
The optimal direction of adversarial perturbation (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016) is towards the
closest decision plane of F . Therefore the optimal adversarial perturbation within max norm
constraint(||∆~x||∞ < ) is,
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∆~x = (sign( ~wt(x) − ~wl))
where t(~x) = arg min
i 6=l
disti(~x)
(5)
In our work, we consider a semi-universal attack where the same adversarial perturbation can in-
duce mis-classification for a large fraction of examples in a particular class. To construct our data-
independent perturbations in the case of deep neural networks we incorporate two approximations
over the above discussed linear perturbation.
A1. The perturbation ∆~x in eqn. 5 is the optimal perturbation for minimizing the difference
between logit value of predicted class and target class i.e. fl(~x) − ft(x)(~x). As our attack
is independent of input x, we can’t find the best target class t(x). So we approximate by
minimizing the difference between the logit value of predicted class and average of other
classes. This is equivalent to replacing ~wt(x) by
∑
i∈{1,2,..k},i6=F (x) ~wi/(k − 1) in eqn. 5.
A2. Neural networks are a composition of linear layers and non-linear activations. For a given
neural network, we create a second network with the same weights and architecture but
ignoring the activation function, and replacing max-pool layers by average-pool layers.
The adversarial perturbation is then computed for this linear network and is used to attack
the original network.
Given a n layered neural network classifier F with parameters Wj , bj and non-linear acti-
vation functions aj (j ∈ {1, 2, ..n − 1}). For a data point x, F (x) and its corresponding
linear network i.e. Flinear(x) are as follows:
F (x) = Wn × an−1(Wn−1 × (....(W2 × a1(W1~x+ b1)
+ b2)....) + bn−1) + bn
(6)
Flinear(x) = Wn × (Wn−1 × (....(W2 × (W1~x+ b1)
+ b2)....) + bn−1) + bn
= U~x+ b
(7)
We obtain class-wise universal adversarial perturbation using the matrix U . The universal perturba-
tion for class j can be defined as,
∆ ~xj = (sign(
∑
i∈{1,2,..K},i6=j
~ui/(K − 1)− ~uj)) (8)
Here ~ui denotes the ith row of matrix U . We demonstrate the effect of both the approximations on
the performance of attack in Section 3.
Implementation details1: We can compute the matrix U by multiplying weight matrices of each
linear layer. But this method is computationally expensive as the weight matrices corresponding
to convolutional layers are large. Instead we use eq. 9 to compute U efficiently. For a randomly
sampled ~x from Rd, U is given by :
U =
∂Flinear(x)
∂x
(9)
Threat model: If an adversary can generate universal adversarial perturbations, it can be used to
attack a high volume of data at a low computational cost. Class-specific adversarial perturbations
may be used to prevent the system from classifying the input as a particular class. For example, in
the case of classifying inappropriate/nude/NSFW images, the adversary can modify the image to get
it classified as non-NSFW.
1For reproducibility of our results, we will open-source our code after publication.
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VGG-F CaffeNet Resnet-18 ResNet-50 VGG-16
VGG-F 51.74 36.47 22.35 15.63 25.17
CaffeNet 40.63 47.32 36.79 25.84 39.43
Resnet-18 49.40 41.26 43.57 33.34 46.85
ResNet-50 46.31 40.78 41.08 33.82 48.10
VGG-16 44.72 42.68 36.08 23.63 46.00
Table 1: Fooling rate of proposed attack for various models trained on ImageNet. Row corresponds to the
model used for calculating perturbation and column corresponds to the attacked model.
Our attack allows the adversary to compute adversarial perturbations without having access to train-
ing data. Even if the adversary has access to training data, it may choose not to use the training data
to improve cross-dataset transferability (Mopuri et al., 2017).
Algorithm 1 Pseudo-code for Computing Universal Matrix
begin
Input: Neural Net Classifier F with k classes. Output: Matrix U .
Construct Flinear from F
d = Input dimension of image
Randomly sample x from Rd
y = Flinear(x)
for i ∈ 1, 2, ..., k do
y[i].backward();
U [i, :] = x.grad
end
return U .
end
4 EXPERIMENTS
Setup: Here we briefly describe the network architecture used for each dataset.
• MNIST: we use a neural network with 2 convolutional layers (32C, 3x3 filter, and 64C,
3x3 filter) and 2 fully connected layers (1024 and 10 units) for our experiments on MNIST
dataset. We used ReLU activations. We trained the classifier for 15 epochs using SGD and
reached a test accuracy of 99.3%.
• CIFAR-10: we trained a 6 layer convolutional neural network (32C 3x3 conv - 64C 3x3
conv - avg-pool - 128C 3x3 conv - avg-pool - 128C 3x3 conv - dropout - 1500 fc - dropout
- 10 fc) using SGD for 60 epochs with L2 regularization and obtained 83.6% test accuracy.
• ImageNet: we use pre-trained models for VGG-16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2015), VGG-
F (Chatfield et al., 2014), Caffenet (Jia et al., 2014), Resnet-18 and Resnet-50 (He et al.,
2016) from Pytorch (Paszke et al., 2017) and Tensorflow’s (Abadi et al., 2016) model zoo.
4.1 RESULTS
Table 1 shows the fooling rates of our attack on a variety of network architectures trained on Ima-
geNet. Each row shows the fooling rates for adversarial perturbations computed using that model
and used to attack other models, i.e., the non-diagonal entries are fooling rates for black-box attacks.
The attack has a fooling rate of 34-51% on these deep networks and transfers well to other models.
E.g., adversarial perturbations computed for Resnet-18 has fooling rates varying from 33.34% to
49.40% on various other architectures. For MNIST and CIFAR-10 we obtained the fooling rate of
87.49% and 51.75%. Note that the fooling rate for a random perturbation is 8-10%. Some of the
adversarial examples are shown in Fig. 1.
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Dataset Attack Success
Rate
MNIST Baseline 97.47
Baseline + A1 81.45
Baseline + A1, A2 87.49
CIFAR-10 Baseline 97.45
Baseline + A1 83.89
Baseline + A1, A2 51.75
Imagenet
(VGG16)
Baseline 99.43
Baseline + A1 96.23
Baseline + A1, A2 46.00
Figure 2: Effect of approximations A1 and A2 on attack
success rate
Figure 3: Time needed to compute perturbation
for different models over Imagenet.
Effect of Approximation A1 and A2: We analyze the effect of approximations A1 and A2 as
explained in section 3 on a baseline input-specific attack. The baseline attack is based on equation
5 by linearizing the neural network around the current input. We use  = 0.3 for MNIST,  =
16.0/255.0 for CIFAR-10, and  = 10.0/255.0 for ImageNet. As shown in Table 2, we observe
high fooling rates despite both the approximations.
Attack time: We compare the time needed to compute our adversarial perturbation with Mopuri
et al. (2017). We use the code provided by the authors for this comparison. As shown in Fig. 2,
our attack is orders of magnitude faster. We timed the algorithms on a GeForce GTX TITAN X
GPU. We refer the reader to (Mopuri et al., 2017) for timing comparison between (Mopuri et al.,
2017) and (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017a). We don’t compare with adversarial perturbation gen-
erator networks (Reddy Mopuri et al., 2018; Hayes & Danezis, 2017) that can generate adversarial
perturbation very fast but take much longer to be trained for a new target network.
5 DISCUSSION
To gain understanding about the workings of our proposed perturbation, we perform various exper-
iments and analyze its findings in this section.
Relationship between Proposed Universal Attack and Example Specific Adversarial Pertur-
bations: We find that the direction of proposed universal attack is aligned with the direction of
example-specific adversarial examples (constructed via FGSM attack). We construct a matrix P
with each column as example-specific adversarial perturbations for MNIST test set. The singular
values of P decay quickly, as shown in Fig. 4A. This suggests that most example-specific pertur-
bations reside in a small subspace spanned by first few singular vectors and any perturbation inside
this subspace should be a good universal perturbation. In fact, a random vector within L∞ bound
sampled from subspace spanned by the first 5 singular vectors obtains 36% fooling rate on average.
Note that computation of singular values and testing of attack success is done on disjoint splits of
the test set. We found that perturbations computed using our method have high cosine similarity
with the first few singular vectors, as shown in Fig. 4B (undefended model).
We also compute the matrix P for an adversarially trained model on MNIST and observed several
differences in properties of its singular values. The singular values decrease more slowly, as shown
in Fig. 3A, and this suggests that the example-specific perturbations don’t reside in a small subspace.
A random vector within L∞ bound sampled from subspace spanned by the first 5 singular vectors
only has 1.7% fooling rate on average. These results show that directions of example-specific per-
turbations don’t have shared direction for adversarially trained models and therefore a single vector
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Figure 4: A. (top) Ratio of ith singular value
to first singular value of matrix P containing
example-wise adversarial perturbations. B. (bot-
tom) Cosine similarity of our universal perturba-
tion for class 0 with singular vectors of matrix P .
Figure 5: Histograms showing number of classes
with different fooling rates for VGG-16 and
Resnet-18 (top to bottom). The average fooling
rate for these models is 46.00% and 43.57% re-
spectively.
can’t have a high fooling rate. We would like to point out that adversarial training can be used to
train a model robust to any attack and this weakness isn’t specific to our attack.
Decision boundaries in deep neural networks are largely linear: The decision boundary be-
tween class i and j for the classifier f can be defined as:
Bij = {~z : fi(~z) = fj(~z)} (10)
i.e. points which are equally likely to be classified in both ith and jth class.
We obtain samples of Bij for MNIST model using adversarial examples. For a data-point x of class
i and its corresponding adversarial example belonging to class j (obtained using targeted FGSM
attack), we interpolate between the two points to get a data-point ~z ∈ Bij which is equally likely
to be classified in class i or j. For the samples obtained in each pairwise decision boundary set
Bij (i, j ∈ 0, 1, 2, ..., 9 and i 6= j), we fit a hyper-plane and obtain its predicted R2(Coefficient of
determination). TheseR2 values can be used to comment on the goodness of fit of the hyper-plane to
the decision boundary, and thus a high R2 means that the hyper-plane can fit the decision boundary
with low error. We find that a significant number of pair-wise boundaries have high predicted R2
(38 out of 81 class-wise boundaries have predicted R2 >= 0.9). The results, thus suggest that the
decision boundaries exhibit a linear nature and thus can be exploited by our attack.
We also compute the R2 values of class boundaries for an adversarially trained model and find that
most of the R2 values are close to 0 (None of 81 class-wise boundaries have predicted R2 >= 0.9).
This shows that the linearity of decision boundaries breaks down for adversarially trained networks.
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Figure 6: (left to right): Adversarial perturbations for VGG-16 with image class as horse-cart and table-lamp,
adversarial perturbations for Resnet-18 with image class as horse-cart and table-lamp.
Previous adversarial attack methods (Goodfellow et al., 2015) have also been motivated by linearity
of deep neural networks.
We find that some classes in ImageNet dataset are inherently harder to misclassify using
universal adversarial perturbations. In Table 1, we show fooling rates averaged over all classes
for images in the ILSVRC validation set. We, now evaluate the fooling rate for each class separately
to examine whether all classes are equally vulnerable to our attack or are some classes easier/harder
to mis-classify. Fig. 5 is a frequency histogram of number of classes at different fooling rates. We
observe high variance in fooling rates among different classes. For example, VGG-16 for ImageNet
dataset has average fooling rate of 46.00% but 77 classes have fooling rate below 20% and 37
classes have fooling rate above 80%.
We also check if the same classes are vulnerable to our attack across different architectures. We
compare fooling rates for each class on VGG-16 and Resnet-18 architectures. The difference in
fooling rate of each class on the two architectures, averaged over all classes is only 10.96%. This
shows that some classes in ILSVRC are inherently harder/easier to mis-classify than others.
6 CONCLUSION
We developed a new method of computing class-wise universal adversarial perturbations that does
not require any training data. The method is particularly interesting due to its simplicity - universal
adversarial perturbations can be directly computed as a linear function of weights of the neural
network. We reported high attack rates across MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets and found
that the adversarial perturbations transfers well across models. We also perform some experiments
that help in understanding how the proposed attack works.
Our results show that the proposed method leverages the linear nature of neural networks to construct
class-wise universal perturbations. Our future work will focus on studying the attack method to
uncover more insights into the vulnerabilities of deep neural networks to adversarial perturbations.
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